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Standardly, philosophical arguments about the 
quality of treatment human beings owe nonhuman 
animals! rest on two bases. Peter Singer is famous 
for arguing from the capacity of animals to feel pain 
to the conclusion that since almost none of the pain 
human beings cause animals is necessary, almost none 
of it is morally justifiable (Singer, 1989, pp. 78-79). 
Singer rests his case on the premise that who suffers 
pain does not affect the badness of the suffering, so 
that, without strong justification, the infliction of pain 
is universally wrong (Ibid., pp. 77-78). Tom Regan is 
equally famous for his argument that the beliefs and 
desires which normal one year-old mammals clearly 
have give those animals rights to life and humane 
treatment (Regan, 1983, pp. 81, 84-86; also, Chapter 9, 
esp. p. 351). Human beings who regularly thwart 
animal desires merely for their own pleasure clearly 
violate those rights. It will be a simple corollary of 
Singer's and Regan's arguments that most uses of 
animals in sports are wrong. Pain is intrinsic to the 
life of animals raised for fighting each other; death is 
an intended statistical regularity in hunting and 
trapping; and most animals bred for racing are killed 
at the conclusion of their racing days. 
Against these lines of argument one frequently 
encounters a certain objection. It is argued that since 
the animals for fighting, hunting and racing exist only 
because they have been bred for such human uses, 
human beings are justified in so treating them. The 
purpose of this paper is to evaluate this line ofobjection, 
or to speak more precisely, to evaluate the two distinct 
objections implicit in this line. For the objection may 
be either that 
(l) the present uses of the animals are justified 
because they are better for the animals than the 
alternative, namely non-existence, or that 
(2) breeding an animal for a purpose gives the 
breeders (transferable) rights over what they 
have bred. 
I shall pursue these alternatives sequentially. 
The Value of Existence 
The strength ofthe first form of the objection rests on 
a common intuition comparing the values of existence 
and non-existence. It is frequently urged that an existence 
which includes many chronic miseries is better than non-
existence (McMahan, 1981, pp. 126-127; and Kavka, 
1981, pp. 109-122). The fact that most persons facing 
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such miseries do not commit suicide is often cited as 
corroborating evidence for this intuition. 
For two reasons, however, this intuition seems a 
problematic basis for the objection. First, some persons 
facing such miseries do commit suicide. And indeed 
one characteristic of miseries which lead many persons 
to suicide is the persons' conviction that their situation 
will not improve (Brandt, 1980, pp. 121-122). This is 
true not only of the psychological miseries which lead 
to many traditional suicides but also of disease 
dehabilitations. Persons in the final stages of Lou 
Gehrig's disease, e.g., are much more likely to commit 
suicide than are diseased persons whose prognosis is 
more favorable in any terms: the control of pain, the 
retention of faculties or the prospect of recovery. It is 
thus not obvious that a life of unattenuated misery is 
better than non-existence. 
But this dialectic line reaches no clear conclusion, 
one way or the other, inasmuch as the lives of animals 
used in fighting, hunting and racing are typically not 
lives of unattenuated misery. I therefore press ahead to 
the second line of response to arguing that since the 
lives of these animals are (arguably) worth living despite 
what misery human beings inflict, human beings are 
entitled to treat these animals, within that limit, as they 
please, since they would not exist at all save for human 
beings bringing about their existence. 
This second line of response does not challenge the 
premise that the lives of animals used in sport are better 
than non-existence. Rather it challenges the inference 
from this premise to the conclusion that, so long as the 
premise remains true, humans may treat animals as they 
please. Suppose that a human being who had neglected, 
harmed or abused another human were to offer this 
defense: however miserable I may have made the life 
of this fellow creature, (s)he was clearly left with a life 
better than death. Obviously this defense, which could 
be offered for almost every crime except homicide and 
the most brutal and irreversible of maimings, fails. One's 
behavior is not acceptable merely because it leaves 
others with a life better than death. 
Thus pro-animal lines of reasoning are not defeated 
by the objection that human uses of animals in sport are 
acceptable since a certain kind of life lived by animals is 
better than non-existence. Even if (and when) the premise 
is maintainable, the conclusion does not follow. 
Some, however, will think that the line of 
reasoning is stronger than my statement of it. For 
people will note this difference between animals used 
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in sports and human victims of crime: at least to a 
large extent, the animals owe their existence to the 
human beings who bred them for human sporting 
purposes. But people are not bred for the criminal 
purposes of other humans. 
The Rights of the Breeder 
I therefore turn to the second objection, that 
breeding an animal for a purpose gives the breeders 
(transferable) rights over what they have bred. The 
argument in support of this second objection is 
analogical. If an artificer creates an artifact from 
materials (s)he owns, the artificer becomes the owner 
of the newly-created artifact. The artifact, being 
property, has no rights of its own. Rather, the owner 
can use it as (s)he pleases, subject only to limitations 
owing to the possible infringement of the rights of 
other human beings (Mill, p. 111). And as artifacts 
are the products of artifice, so animals used in sport 
are the products of breeding. As artifacts are property, 
so bred animals are property. As artifacts are made 
for the purpose of the artificer, so animals used in sport 
are bred for the purposes of the breeders, which are to 
have the animals used in the usual sporting ways. And 
rights over both will be similarly transferable. 
Clearly, the central question about this analogical 
objection to pro-animal views is the strength of the 
analogy on which itrests. Before directly examining that 
strength, however, I note the extension the objection 
appears to have. Obviously, the analogy applies, as 
intended, to animals bred for sporting uses. Italso applies 
to animals bred for traditional factory farming. For 
instance, the resistance ofheifers and chickens to the close 
quarters of factory farms creates an undesirable cost for 
factory farmers which breeders have worked to eliminate. 
The argument, however, has other extensions which 
might be less sanguine: 
(I) Where some might object to the analogy 
between making artifacts and breeding animals 
on the grounds that traditional breeding does not 
involve the degree of material alteration of 
traditional artifact making, genetic engineering 
clearly reduces that gap. For example, one 
extension of the analogy is to the projected 
salmon farms of Peuget Sound. The salmon 
projected for this farming will be genetically 
engineered. Beyond the terms of traditional 
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animal husbandry, these fish will be bred for 
quick growth by the insertion of non-salmon 
genes into their genetic material (MacKenzie, 
1989, p. 54). Thus it is unclear that the degree 
of material alteration will continue to mark a 
clear distinction between traditional artifact 
making and the breeding of animals. 
(2) A second extension of the analogy is to animals 
in national parks, which are not often bred. Yet, 
from an evolutionary viewpoint, neither are the 
parks the preserves they are popularly thought 
to be. The animals live to a significant extent in 
the presence of tourists and other humans. 
Animals who have initiated aggression against 
human beings have been killed. By their 
elimination, the gene pool is selected for non-
aggression against humans. Similarly, whenever 
contact with human beings or the managed 
environment of the park affects the reproductive 
success of individuals, that effect is functionally 
equivalent to breeding. Certainly the national 
parks are full of animals amenable to picture 
taking by humans. 
(3) Perhaps most disturbing is the import of the 
analogy for a recent controversy. Recall the 
suggestion that the imputed superiority of 
America's black athletes derives from the 
selective breeding of slaves (Wiggins, 1989, pp. 
180-185). For the sake of discussion, let us 
postulate that the control of slave-owners over 
the reproductive success of slaves has produced 
a present population in which variously 
athletically valuable traits are especially 
prominent. Even if this is granted, clearly the 
application of the analogy yields an untoward 
result. Contrary to any egalitarian conception 
of human rights, contrary to any principle of anti-
slavery, the application of the analogy is that 
1. the breeders have rights over what they have 
bred, in such a way that 
2. what they have bred is indeed their property, 
with the further implication that 
3. as the breeder of the mare has rights over 
the foal, so the breeder of the slave has 
rights over the child (and the child's child) 
of the slave. 
Here we reach an important conclusion, which 
I shall first state as follows: Ifa group of human 
beings is enslaved and bred, the breeding of 
the slaves does not give the breeders rights over 
the offspring. 
The importance of this conclusion, however, is 
not really about slavery, as we can see from the 
following: imagine that slavery is illegal in the 
strong sense that persons do not have the right 
to make themselves the slaves of another. Even 
in those circumstances, it is possible that one 
party will convince two other parties to 
reproduce. Or, more simply, two parties may 
convince themselves that they should reproduce. 
We may also imagine that the parties who do 
the convincing also take pains to control which 
sperm and ovum unite. Such a taking of pains 
will, I suppose, make the pain taker(s) the 
breeder(s) of the resulting infant.2 
But no matter how carefully a union of human 
sperm and ovum is controlled, the implication 
will not follow that since the offspring would 
not exist save for the breeding, therefore the 
breeder has strong rights of control over the 
offspring. Granted, there have been eras in 
which parental rights have been de facto strong 
over children (even grown children with children 
of their own). Yet the argument we would make 
is that the growing capacities of a child to 
manage its own life make the continued, 
undiminishing authority of the parent over the 
child unjustifiable. 
The Use of Animals in Sport 
Having explored this analogical argument from 
breeding and the objection to it, based on the imagined 
breeding of humans, I return to the issue of this paper, 
the use of animals in sport. Should we accept the 
analogical argument from artificers to animal breeders 
or, contrarily, should we accept the objection from the 
human case to the conclusion that breeders do not have 
the rights of artificers? 
To answer this question, I propose to consider what 
organisms are like. For animals used in sport are 
organisms, whereas the artifacts which the artificer 
analogy brings to mind are not organisms.3 Thus the 
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analogy of artificers to breeders requires a strong 
analogy between artifacts and organisms. The other 
reason for thinking that we should consider what 
organisms are like focuses on my argument that, even 
if human beings were bred, their being bred would not 
give their breeders rights over them. Any force of that 
argument also rests on an analogy, an analogy between 
any bred human beings and any animals bred for 
sporting purposes. The analogy is at least that all such 
bred creatures are organisms. 
What then is an organism? We may at least say that 
an organism is always an entity with parts, for it is the 
way in which a thing's parts relate that make a thing an 
organism. The parts (or organs, we might say) of an 
organism interact in an interdependent way. That is, 
the non-functioning of a given part would impair or 
make impossible the functioning of the other parts, the 
extreme result being the death of the organism. 
Moreover, because the functioning of the parts of 
organisms is interdependent, it is not at all surprising 
that the parts of organisms react in coordinated, self-
regulative ways, through sensing and response devices. 
Indeed, recuperative powers of organisms harmed 
through disease or injury exemplify this coordinative, 
self-regulatory power in threatening environments. 
Now if self-regulation is characteristic of organisms 
in general, nevertheless organisms differ in the 
mechanisms of self-regulation.4 Evolutionary biologists 
note the possibility of predicting a species' genetic 
endowment from the constancy of the organisms' 
environment (in terms of food supply, possibilities for 
reproduction, and lethal forces). The more constant an 
organism's environment is, the more successful will be 
a genetic endowment which hardwires sensory 
capacities (for discriminating food, reproductive 
opportunities, and danger) to response capacities. 
Contrarily, if the organism's environment varies because 
the food, the reproductive opportunities or the dangers 
vary (perhaps in response to the organism), then 
hardwired response capacities become disadvan-
tageous. In other words, hardwired responses maximize 
efficiency, but their effectiveness will be inversely 
proportional to environmental variability. 
Now if we think about the hardwiring of response 
to sensory capacities, we may note that, for sexual 
animals, eating, reproducing and avoiding dangers in 
the environment all involve interaction with other 
organisms. Moreover, these other organisms will have 
at least diverse, if not contrary, desiderata. Therefore, 
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evolution will tend to advantage those other 
organisms who do not passively fit into the activities 
of the other. Similarly, evolution will tend to favor 
active organisms who can sense and respond to the 
responses of others. 
Internally to an animal, such adaptation means that 
the wiring is not so full or not so fixed. Environmentally, 
such adaptation means that the animal's behavior will 
be a product of learning how to sense and respond in 
nuanced ways. Accordingly, many of the successful 
organisms in variable environments tum out to be 
organisms that learn. And in species living in variable 
environments and relying on learning, the young spend 
a period of immaturity not only being nourished and 
growing, but also learning. By developing a repertoire 
of nuanced responses, the young become more suited 
to living successfully within their environment, even 
without the aid of progenitors. 
Thus an organism is a whole whose parts interact in 
interdependent ways through which the organism is 
more able to succeed in its environment.s For many 
birds and most mammals, successful interdependent 
interaction of parts requires considerable learning. 
Now various are the roles of such evolutionary 
adaptation, when animals are used in sport. In hunting 
the focus is confused. One emphasis is on a competition 
between hunter and hunted, but the other emphasis is 
on the bravado of success in the hunt. Here learning 
plays many roles. (1) The hunted animals learn to sense 
and avoid dangers. The hunters can in tum learn how 
to make their presence hard to sense. Here we have a 
classic evolutionary competition, a zero-sum game, 
which, played over time, improves the skills of both 
the hunted and the hunter (Dawkins, 1986,pp.180-181). 
(2) But the human hunter need not merely compete. 
The human hunter may set the terms of the competition. 
The hunter chooses the weapons of the hunt. The hunter 
decides whether to destroy the competition, e.g., by 
blinding the deer with floodlights. The technology of 
the hunter is thus ample to disdain the classic 
evolutionary competition for the bravado of the 
successful hunt. But evolutionarily this is simply a 
hunter's trick, and the hunter is tricked. If I am equally 
thrilled by the successful hunt no matter how I kill the 
animal, so are my taste buds fooled by the sweetness 
of saccharine to a gratification reenforced by the 
nutritive value of fructose. The ability of the human 
being to set the terms of its own pleasure is a double-
edged sword insofar as it allows us to divorce our 
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pleasures from the evolutionary causes for their 
gratifying us.6 
In animal fights, two problems arise. The environ-
ment of the fight is manipulated to guarantee a victor 
and vanquished. And, either inside or outside of the 
fight, death is the fate of the vanquished. This factor 
mirrors the possible manipulation of the hunting 
environment. The anthropocentric problem at this point 
is with the desirability of promoting a certain human 
vantage point and its correlative sentiment. For the 
spectator may easily identify with the perspective of 
the environment creator, a manipulative perspective 
from which deaths of others can be controlled while 
one remains an aloof, spectating non-participant. 
The second problem arises because, as one controls 
a lethal environment, one also controls an evolution. 
The animals who survive such an environment are 
genotypes bred for a vicious competition. Again I sense 
an anthropocentric problem: what place should we give 
to the human sentiments stirred by the model of 
viciousness the fighting animals present? 
In racing, the focus is on a non-fatal competition 
among animals. Activities of rooting and practices of 
betting extend the competition, vicariously, to human 
beings. Compulsive gamblers aside, human beings, 
through racing, create environments in which to 
experience the thrills ofcompetition without its dangers. 
This creation of an environment, however, does not, to 
my knowledge, impinge on the racing animals in the 
way the flood lights trap the buck, nor in the way the 
fighting selects animals for their viciousness. Rather, 
the difficulties about racing occur when, through injury 
or age, a racing animal is no longer competitive. The 
analogy of bred animals to artifacts is that a useless 
artifact may be destroyed. 
Can we, then, accept this analogy? Does a thing's 
being an artifact imply the sovereignty of the artificer 
over the artifact? or does a thing's being an organism 
imply the rights of the thing against it progenitor? The 
argument from the bred human infant is that what the 
human being becomes as it matures makes it unjustifiable 
to exercise an artificer's rights over it. This argument 
focuses the issue of older racing animals on the fact that, 
although animals are legally the property of their owners, 
unlike other properties, these animals mature not only by 
growing but also by learning. Their genetic stock is 
adapted for environments in which their behaving as they 
have learned will benefit them. In this regard they are 
like human beings, not like typical artifacts. 
Between the Species 
Clearly, the use of animals in sports raises a number 
of anthropocentric issues about the desirability of 
promoting certain traits and values among human 
beings. Having surveyed these anthropocentric issues, 
I return to my central question of whether bred animals 
are justifiably treated as artifacts. Here the ethical 
terrain is tricky. 
Traditional anti-factory farm arguments, which 
emphasize either the pain or the frustrations and 
anxieties animals experience under actual conditions, 
seem to play into the hands of agriculturalists who, for 
reasons of cost and profit, would aim to breed farm 
animals so as not to experience pain, frustration or 
anxiety. That is, for the agriculturalist, a farm animal 
is valuable insofar as it is a source of protein. The more 
efficiently that protein can be developed, the better for 
the farmer. Bones and sinews, aggression against each 
other and the biochemical accompaniments of manifest 
anxiety are all agricultural costs the farmer would be 
pleased to eliminate for the right price. Thus, the pro-
animal advocate must be prepared to face the response 
that any objection to causing animals pain or frustration 
can be rendered moot without changing either factory 
farming practice or consumer dietary habits: one can 
simply breed the capacities to feel pain and frustration 
out of our favorite growing blobs of protein. 
Now my point is that the argument I have mustered 
against the analogy between breeders and artificers 
rests on the disanalogy between the learning capacities 
ofbred animals which traditional artifacts do not share. 
But a food animal which had the capacities for pain, 
frustration and anxiety bred out of it might well lack 
the learning capacities which seem to differentiate 
the appropriate treatment of bred animals and 
traditional artifacts. 
When we use animals in sport, however, our interest 
is not in the efficient creation of consumable protein. 
Animals typically need learning capacities in order to 
perform optimally in the sport. In other words, optimal 
animal performance relies on a disanalogy between bred 
animals and artifacts? at just the point which compromises 
the argument that animal breeders have rights over what 
they have bred comparable to the rights of artificers over 
their artifacts. The learning capacities ofanimals, which 
are so vital to their involvement in human sports, are the 
very basis for the conclusion that the ethical strictures 
appropriate to any bred human children, which arise from 
their capacities for learning and increasing self-direction, 
apply to animals used in sports. 
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Notes McMahan, Jefferson. "Problems of Population Theory," 
1 From this point on, when I refer to animals, I mean 
nonhuman animals. 
2 In England, for example, in vitro fertilization is available 
to prospective parents only if they meet a large array of 
conditions. Thus the resulting infants are (extensionally) bred 
for in whatever ways that array of conditions correlates with 
genetic traits. 
3 Once I provide a defmition of an organism (below), it 
will be clear that being an organism does not imply whether 
an entity is materially made up of genetic material. 
Accordingly, it is on my definition a contingent question 
whether a human could create an artifact that was an organism 
(regardless of whether it was composed of genetic material). 
4 My defmition of organism correctly leaves open what 
kind of organizational relationship exists between sensory and 
(re)active capacities of the organism in the light of which the 
coordinated self-regulative action occurs and the recuperative 
powers operate. 
5 I do not advertise this statement as a full definition of 
an organism. Rather, I hold that an organism is fundamentally 
an entity such that the interdependent interaction of its parts 
maintains a disentropic state (Scherer, 1988). That fimdamental 
point, however, seems unnecessary to the argument here. 
6 Cf. J. Baird Callicott, (1980, 311-38) for the seminal 
discussion of the evolutionary evaluation ofpleasure and pain. 
7And a corresponding analogy between bred animals and 
my imagined bred humans. 
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